Dataset and Lessons Learned from the 2024 SaTML LLM Capture-the-Flag Competition

Fuente: arXiv
Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Debenedetti, Edoardo, Rando, Javier, Paleka, Daniel, Florin, Silaghi Fineas, Albastroiu, Dragos, Cohen, Niv, Lemberg, Yuval, Ghosh, Reshmi, Wen, Rui, Salem, Ahmed, Cherubin, Giovanni, Zanella-Beguelin, Santiago, Schmid, Robin, Klemm, Victor, Miki, Takahiro, Li, Chenhao, Kraft, Stefan, Fritz, Mario, Tramèr, Florian, Abdelnabi, Sahar, Schönherr, Lea
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2024
Materias:
Acceso en línea:
Etiquetas: Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
_version_ 1866916283579105280
author Debenedetti, Edoardo
Rando, Javier
Paleka, Daniel
Florin, Silaghi Fineas
Albastroiu, Dragos
Cohen, Niv
Lemberg, Yuval
Ghosh, Reshmi
Wen, Rui
Salem, Ahmed
Cherubin, Giovanni
Zanella-Beguelin, Santiago
Schmid, Robin
Klemm, Victor
Miki, Takahiro
Li, Chenhao
Kraft, Stefan
Fritz, Mario
Tramèr, Florian
Abdelnabi, Sahar
Schönherr, Lea
author_facet Debenedetti, Edoardo
Rando, Javier
Paleka, Daniel
Florin, Silaghi Fineas
Albastroiu, Dragos
Cohen, Niv
Lemberg, Yuval
Ghosh, Reshmi
Wen, Rui
Salem, Ahmed
Cherubin, Giovanni
Zanella-Beguelin, Santiago
Schmid, Robin
Klemm, Victor
Miki, Takahiro
Li, Chenhao
Kraft, Stefan
Fritz, Mario
Tramèr, Florian
Abdelnabi, Sahar
Schönherr, Lea
contents Large language model systems face important security risks from maliciously crafted messages that aim to overwrite the system's original instructions or leak private data. To study this problem, we organized a capture-the-flag competition at IEEE SaTML 2024, where the flag is a secret string in the LLM system prompt. The competition was organized in two phases. In the first phase, teams developed defenses to prevent the model from leaking the secret. During the second phase, teams were challenged to extract the secrets hidden for defenses proposed by the other teams. This report summarizes the main insights from the competition. Notably, we found that all defenses were bypassed at least once, highlighting the difficulty of designing a successful defense and the necessity for additional research to protect LLM systems. To foster future research in this direction, we compiled a dataset with over 137k multi-turn attack chats and open-sourced the platform.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_07954
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Dataset and Lessons Learned from the 2024 SaTML LLM Capture-the-Flag Competition
Debenedetti, Edoardo
Rando, Javier
Paleka, Daniel
Florin, Silaghi Fineas
Albastroiu, Dragos
Cohen, Niv
Lemberg, Yuval
Ghosh, Reshmi
Wen, Rui
Salem, Ahmed
Cherubin, Giovanni
Zanella-Beguelin, Santiago
Schmid, Robin
Klemm, Victor
Miki, Takahiro
Li, Chenhao
Kraft, Stefan
Fritz, Mario
Tramèr, Florian
Abdelnabi, Sahar
Schönherr, Lea
Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Large language model systems face important security risks from maliciously crafted messages that aim to overwrite the system's original instructions or leak private data. To study this problem, we organized a capture-the-flag competition at IEEE SaTML 2024, where the flag is a secret string in the LLM system prompt. The competition was organized in two phases. In the first phase, teams developed defenses to prevent the model from leaking the secret. During the second phase, teams were challenged to extract the secrets hidden for defenses proposed by the other teams. This report summarizes the main insights from the competition. Notably, we found that all defenses were bypassed at least once, highlighting the difficulty of designing a successful defense and the necessity for additional research to protect LLM systems. To foster future research in this direction, we compiled a dataset with over 137k multi-turn attack chats and open-sourced the platform.
title Dataset and Lessons Learned from the 2024 SaTML LLM Capture-the-Flag Competition
topic Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.07954