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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.08084 |
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| _version_ | 1866929383028031488 |
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| author | Kireev, Klim Mykhno, Yevhen Troncoso, Carmela Overdorf, Rebekah |
| author_facet | Kireev, Klim Mykhno, Yevhen Troncoso, Carmela Overdorf, Rebekah |
| contents | Information-based attacks on social media, such as disinformation campaigns and propaganda, are emerging cybersecurity threats. The security community has focused on countering these threats on social media platforms like X and Reddit. However, they also appear in instant-messaging social media platforms such as WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal. In these platforms information-based attacks primarily happen in groups and channels, requiring manual moderation efforts by channel administrators. We collect, label, and analyze a large dataset of more than 17 million Telegram comments and messages. Our analysis uncovers two independent, coordinated networks that spread pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian propaganda, garnering replies from real users. We propose a novel mechanism for detecting propaganda that capitalizes on the relationship between legitimate user messages and propaganda replies and is tailored to the information that Telegram makes available to moderators. Our method is faster, cheaper, and has a detection rate (97.6%) 11.6 percentage points higher than human moderators after seeing only one message from an account. It remains effective despite evolving propaganda. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_08084 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Characterizing and Detecting Propaganda-Spreading Accounts on Telegram Kireev, Klim Mykhno, Yevhen Troncoso, Carmela Overdorf, Rebekah Social and Information Networks Cryptography and Security Information-based attacks on social media, such as disinformation campaigns and propaganda, are emerging cybersecurity threats. The security community has focused on countering these threats on social media platforms like X and Reddit. However, they also appear in instant-messaging social media platforms such as WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal. In these platforms information-based attacks primarily happen in groups and channels, requiring manual moderation efforts by channel administrators. We collect, label, and analyze a large dataset of more than 17 million Telegram comments and messages. Our analysis uncovers two independent, coordinated networks that spread pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian propaganda, garnering replies from real users. We propose a novel mechanism for detecting propaganda that capitalizes on the relationship between legitimate user messages and propaganda replies and is tailored to the information that Telegram makes available to moderators. Our method is faster, cheaper, and has a detection rate (97.6%) 11.6 percentage points higher than human moderators after seeing only one message from an account. It remains effective despite evolving propaganda. |
| title | Characterizing and Detecting Propaganda-Spreading Accounts on Telegram |
| topic | Social and Information Networks Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.08084 |