An Industry Interview Study of Software Signing for Supply Chain Security

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Kalu, Kelechi G., Singla, Tanya, Okafor, Chinenye, Torres-Arias, Santiago, Davis, James C.
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2024
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author Kalu, Kelechi G.
Singla, Tanya
Okafor, Chinenye
Torres-Arias, Santiago
Davis, James C.
author_facet Kalu, Kelechi G.
Singla, Tanya
Okafor, Chinenye
Torres-Arias, Santiago
Davis, James C.
contents Many software products are composed of components integrated from other teams or external parties. Each additional link in a software product's supply chain increases the risk of the injection of malicious behavior. To improve supply chain provenance, many cybersecurity frameworks, standards, and regulations recommend the use of software signing. However, recent surveys and measurement studies have found that the adoption rate and quality of software signatures are low. We lack in-depth industry perspectives on the challenges and practices of software signing. To understand software signing in practice, we interviewed 18 experienced security practitioners across 13 organizations. We study the challenges that affect the effective implementation of software signing in practice. We also provide possible impacts of experienced software supply chain failures, security standards, and regulations on software signing adoption. To summarize our findings: (1) We present a refined model of the software supply chain factory model highlighting practitioner's signing practices; (2) We highlight the different challenges-technical, organizational, and human-that hamper software signing implementation; (3) We report that experts disagree on the importance of signing; and (4) We describe how internal and external events affect the adoption of software signing. Our work describes the considerations for adopting software signing as one aspect of the broader goal of improved software supply chain security.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_08198
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle An Industry Interview Study of Software Signing for Supply Chain Security
Kalu, Kelechi G.
Singla, Tanya
Okafor, Chinenye
Torres-Arias, Santiago
Davis, James C.
Software Engineering
Cryptography and Security
Many software products are composed of components integrated from other teams or external parties. Each additional link in a software product's supply chain increases the risk of the injection of malicious behavior. To improve supply chain provenance, many cybersecurity frameworks, standards, and regulations recommend the use of software signing. However, recent surveys and measurement studies have found that the adoption rate and quality of software signatures are low. We lack in-depth industry perspectives on the challenges and practices of software signing. To understand software signing in practice, we interviewed 18 experienced security practitioners across 13 organizations. We study the challenges that affect the effective implementation of software signing in practice. We also provide possible impacts of experienced software supply chain failures, security standards, and regulations on software signing adoption. To summarize our findings: (1) We present a refined model of the software supply chain factory model highlighting practitioner's signing practices; (2) We highlight the different challenges-technical, organizational, and human-that hamper software signing implementation; (3) We report that experts disagree on the importance of signing; and (4) We describe how internal and external events affect the adoption of software signing. Our work describes the considerations for adopting software signing as one aspect of the broader goal of improved software supply chain security.
title An Industry Interview Study of Software Signing for Supply Chain Security
topic Software Engineering
Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.08198