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IMFL-AIGC: Incentive Mechanism Design for Federated Learning Empowered by Artificial Intelligence Generated Content

Fuente: arXiv

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Dettagli Bibliografici
Autori principali:	Huang, Guangjing, Wu, Qiong, Li, Jingyi, Chen, Xu
Natura:	Preprint
Pubblicazione:	2024
Soggetti:	Machine Learning Artificial Intelligence Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Computer Science and Game Theory
Accesso online:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Aggiungi Tag Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!

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