Matching With Pre-Existing Binding Agreements: The Agreeable Core
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866915001342623744 |
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| author | Doe, Peter |
| author_facet | Doe, Peter |
| contents | Matching market models ignore prior commitments. Yet many job seekers, for example, are already employed, and the same holds for many other matching markets. I analyze two-sided matching markets with pre-existing binding agreements between market participants. In this model, a pair of participants bound to each other by a pre-existing agreement must agree to any action they take. To analyze their behavior, I propose a new solution concept, the agreeable core, consisting of the matches which cannot be renegotiated without violating the binding agreements. My main contribution is an algorithm that constructs such a match by a novel combination of the Deferred Acceptance and Top Trading Cycles algorithms. The algorithm is robust to various manipulations and has applications to numerous markets including the resident-to-hospital match, college admissions, school choice, and labor markets. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_08700 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Matching With Pre-Existing Binding Agreements: The Agreeable Core Doe, Peter Theoretical Economics Matching market models ignore prior commitments. Yet many job seekers, for example, are already employed, and the same holds for many other matching markets. I analyze two-sided matching markets with pre-existing binding agreements between market participants. In this model, a pair of participants bound to each other by a pre-existing agreement must agree to any action they take. To analyze their behavior, I propose a new solution concept, the agreeable core, consisting of the matches which cannot be renegotiated without violating the binding agreements. My main contribution is an algorithm that constructs such a match by a novel combination of the Deferred Acceptance and Top Trading Cycles algorithms. The algorithm is robust to various manipulations and has applications to numerous markets including the resident-to-hospital match, college admissions, school choice, and labor markets. |
| title | Matching With Pre-Existing Binding Agreements: The Agreeable Core |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.08700 |