Mechanism Design by a Politician
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| Materias: | |
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| _version_ | 1866912327488503808 |
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| author | Bolgè, Giovanni Valvassori |
| author_facet | Bolgè, Giovanni Valvassori |
| contents | A set of agents has to make a decision about the provision of a public good and its financing. Agents have heterogeneous values for the public good and each agent's value is private information. An agenda-setter has the right to make a proposal about a public-good level and a vector of contributions. For the proposal to be approved, only the favourable votes of a subset of agents are needed. If the proposal is not approved, a type-dependent outside option is implemented. I characterize the optimal public-good provision and the coalition-formation for any outside option in dominant strategies. Optimal public-good provision might be a non-monotonic function of the outside option public-good level. Moreover, the optimal coalition might be a non-convex set of types. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_08936 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Mechanism Design by a Politician Bolgè, Giovanni Valvassori Theoretical Economics A set of agents has to make a decision about the provision of a public good and its financing. Agents have heterogeneous values for the public good and each agent's value is private information. An agenda-setter has the right to make a proposal about a public-good level and a vector of contributions. For the proposal to be approved, only the favourable votes of a subset of agents are needed. If the proposal is not approved, a type-dependent outside option is implemented. I characterize the optimal public-good provision and the coalition-formation for any outside option in dominant strategies. Optimal public-good provision might be a non-monotonic function of the outside option public-good level. Moreover, the optimal coalition might be a non-convex set of types. |
| title | Mechanism Design by a Politician |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.08936 |