Embracing the Enemy

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Delgado-Vega, Álvaro, Schneider, Johannes
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2024
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author Delgado-Vega, Álvaro
Schneider, Johannes
author_facet Delgado-Vega, Álvaro
Schneider, Johannes
contents Two agents repeatedly compete for the power to set policy. A principal partially influences the power allocation. All three players may disagree on policy, but one agent (the ``friend'') aligns more closely with the principal than the other (the ``enemy''). The principal's optimal contract aims to exclude the enemy initially. However, once the enemy gains power, the principal embraces him, trading power for policy moderation. Moreover, the principal leverages the enemy's moderation to move the friend's policies toward her bliss point. If her commitment is strong enough, a principal offers more embrace to the enemy when her friend is close.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_09734
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Embracing the Enemy
Delgado-Vega, Álvaro
Schneider, Johannes
Theoretical Economics
Two agents repeatedly compete for the power to set policy. A principal partially influences the power allocation. All three players may disagree on policy, but one agent (the ``friend'') aligns more closely with the principal than the other (the ``enemy''). The principal's optimal contract aims to exclude the enemy initially. However, once the enemy gains power, the principal embraces him, trading power for policy moderation. Moreover, the principal leverages the enemy's moderation to move the friend's policies toward her bliss point. If her commitment is strong enough, a principal offers more embrace to the enemy when her friend is close.
title Embracing the Enemy
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.09734