Byzantine-Robust Decentralized Federated Learning
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866917721373933568 |
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| author | Fang, Minghong Zhang, Zifan Hairi Khanduri, Prashant Liu, Jia Lu, Songtao Liu, Yuchen Gong, Neil |
| author_facet | Fang, Minghong Zhang, Zifan Hairi Khanduri, Prashant Liu, Jia Lu, Songtao Liu, Yuchen Gong, Neil |
| contents | Federated learning (FL) enables multiple clients to collaboratively train machine learning models without revealing their private training data. In conventional FL, the system follows the server-assisted architecture (server-assisted FL), where the training process is coordinated by a central server. However, the server-assisted FL framework suffers from poor scalability due to a communication bottleneck at the server, and trust dependency issues. To address challenges, decentralized federated learning (DFL) architecture has been proposed to allow clients to train models collaboratively in a serverless and peer-to-peer manner. However, due to its fully decentralized nature, DFL is highly vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious clients could manipulate the system by sending carefully-crafted local models to their neighboring clients. To date, only a limited number of Byzantine-robust DFL methods have been proposed, most of which are either communication-inefficient or remain vulnerable to advanced poisoning attacks. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm called BALANCE (Byzantine-robust averaging through local similarity in decentralization) to defend against poisoning attacks in DFL. In BALANCE, each client leverages its own local model as a similarity reference to determine if the received model is malicious or benign. We establish the theoretical convergence guarantee for BALANCE under poisoning attacks in both strongly convex and non-convex settings. Furthermore, the convergence rate of BALANCE under poisoning attacks matches those of the state-of-the-art counterparts in Byzantine-free settings. Extensive experiments also demonstrate that BALANCE outperforms existing DFL methods and effectively defends against poisoning attacks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_10416 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Byzantine-Robust Decentralized Federated Learning Fang, Minghong Zhang, Zifan Hairi Khanduri, Prashant Liu, Jia Lu, Songtao Liu, Yuchen Gong, Neil Cryptography and Security Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Machine Learning Federated learning (FL) enables multiple clients to collaboratively train machine learning models without revealing their private training data. In conventional FL, the system follows the server-assisted architecture (server-assisted FL), where the training process is coordinated by a central server. However, the server-assisted FL framework suffers from poor scalability due to a communication bottleneck at the server, and trust dependency issues. To address challenges, decentralized federated learning (DFL) architecture has been proposed to allow clients to train models collaboratively in a serverless and peer-to-peer manner. However, due to its fully decentralized nature, DFL is highly vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious clients could manipulate the system by sending carefully-crafted local models to their neighboring clients. To date, only a limited number of Byzantine-robust DFL methods have been proposed, most of which are either communication-inefficient or remain vulnerable to advanced poisoning attacks. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm called BALANCE (Byzantine-robust averaging through local similarity in decentralization) to defend against poisoning attacks in DFL. In BALANCE, each client leverages its own local model as a similarity reference to determine if the received model is malicious or benign. We establish the theoretical convergence guarantee for BALANCE under poisoning attacks in both strongly convex and non-convex settings. Furthermore, the convergence rate of BALANCE under poisoning attacks matches those of the state-of-the-art counterparts in Byzantine-free settings. Extensive experiments also demonstrate that BALANCE outperforms existing DFL methods and effectively defends against poisoning attacks. |
| title | Byzantine-Robust Decentralized Federated Learning |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.10416 |