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Incentivizing Quality Text Generation via Statistical Contracts

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Saig, Eden, Einav, Ohad, Talgam-Cohen, Inbal
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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