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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.12094 |
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| _version_ | 1866910564513480704 |
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| author | Ghandeharioun, Asma Yuan, Ann Guerard, Marius Reif, Emily Lepori, Michael A. Dixon, Lucas |
| author_facet | Ghandeharioun, Asma Yuan, Ann Guerard, Marius Reif, Emily Lepori, Michael A. Dixon, Lucas |
| contents | Despite investments in improving model safety, studies show that misaligned capabilities remain latent in safety-tuned models. In this work, we shed light on the mechanics of this phenomenon. First, we show that even when model generations are safe, harmful content can persist in hidden representations and can be extracted by decoding from earlier layers. Then, we show that whether the model divulges such content depends significantly on its perception of who it is talking to, which we refer to as user persona. In fact, we find manipulating user persona to be even more effective for eliciting harmful content than direct attempts to control model refusal. We study both natural language prompting and activation steering as control methods and show that activation steering is significantly more effective at bypassing safety filters. We investigate why certain personas break model safeguards and find that they enable the model to form more charitable interpretations of otherwise dangerous queries. Finally, we show we can predict a persona's effect on refusal given only the geometry of its steering vector. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_12094 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Who's asking? User personas and the mechanics of latent misalignment Ghandeharioun, Asma Yuan, Ann Guerard, Marius Reif, Emily Lepori, Michael A. Dixon, Lucas Computation and Language Artificial Intelligence Despite investments in improving model safety, studies show that misaligned capabilities remain latent in safety-tuned models. In this work, we shed light on the mechanics of this phenomenon. First, we show that even when model generations are safe, harmful content can persist in hidden representations and can be extracted by decoding from earlier layers. Then, we show that whether the model divulges such content depends significantly on its perception of who it is talking to, which we refer to as user persona. In fact, we find manipulating user persona to be even more effective for eliciting harmful content than direct attempts to control model refusal. We study both natural language prompting and activation steering as control methods and show that activation steering is significantly more effective at bypassing safety filters. We investigate why certain personas break model safeguards and find that they enable the model to form more charitable interpretations of otherwise dangerous queries. Finally, we show we can predict a persona's effect on refusal given only the geometry of its steering vector. |
| title | Who's asking? User personas and the mechanics of latent misalignment |
| topic | Computation and Language Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.12094 |