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Persuasion and Optimal Stopping

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Koh, Andrew, Sanguanmoo, Sivakorn, Zhong, Weijie
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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