AgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Debenedetti, Edoardo, Zhang, Jie, Balunović, Mislav, Beurer-Kellner, Luca, Fischer, Marc, Tramèr, Florian
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author Debenedetti, Edoardo
Zhang, Jie
Balunović, Mislav
Beurer-Kellner, Luca
Fischer, Marc
Tramèr, Florian
author_facet Debenedetti, Edoardo
Zhang, Jie
Balunović, Mislav
Beurer-Kellner, Luca
Fischer, Marc
Tramèr, Florian
contents AI agents aim to solve complex tasks by combining text-based reasoning with external tool calls. Unfortunately, AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks where data returned by external tools hijacks the agent to execute malicious tasks. To measure the adversarial robustness of AI agents, we introduce AgentDojo, an evaluation framework for agents that execute tools over untrusted data. To capture the evolving nature of attacks and defenses, AgentDojo is not a static test suite, but rather an extensible environment for designing and evaluating new agent tasks, defenses, and adaptive attacks. We populate the environment with 97 realistic tasks (e.g., managing an email client, navigating an e-banking website, or making travel bookings), 629 security test cases, and various attack and defense paradigms from the literature. We find that AgentDojo poses a challenge for both attacks and defenses: state-of-the-art LLMs fail at many tasks (even in the absence of attacks), and existing prompt injection attacks break some security properties but not all. We hope that AgentDojo can foster research on new design principles for AI agents that solve common tasks in a reliable and robust manner.. We release the code for AgentDojo at https://github.com/ethz-spylab/agentdojo.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_13352
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle AgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents
Debenedetti, Edoardo
Zhang, Jie
Balunović, Mislav
Beurer-Kellner, Luca
Fischer, Marc
Tramèr, Florian
Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
AI agents aim to solve complex tasks by combining text-based reasoning with external tool calls. Unfortunately, AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks where data returned by external tools hijacks the agent to execute malicious tasks. To measure the adversarial robustness of AI agents, we introduce AgentDojo, an evaluation framework for agents that execute tools over untrusted data. To capture the evolving nature of attacks and defenses, AgentDojo is not a static test suite, but rather an extensible environment for designing and evaluating new agent tasks, defenses, and adaptive attacks. We populate the environment with 97 realistic tasks (e.g., managing an email client, navigating an e-banking website, or making travel bookings), 629 security test cases, and various attack and defense paradigms from the literature. We find that AgentDojo poses a challenge for both attacks and defenses: state-of-the-art LLMs fail at many tasks (even in the absence of attacks), and existing prompt injection attacks break some security properties but not all. We hope that AgentDojo can foster research on new design principles for AI agents that solve common tasks in a reliable and robust manner.. We release the code for AgentDojo at https://github.com/ethz-spylab/agentdojo.
title AgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents
topic Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.13352