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Bundling in Oligopoly: Revenue Maximization with Single-Item Competitors

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Babaioff, Moshe, Cai, Linda, Lucier, Brendan
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2024
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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