Planning Against a Prophet: A Graph-Theoretic Framework for Making Sequential Decisions

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Cristi, Andrés, Oren, Sigal
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2024
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author Cristi, Andrés
Oren, Sigal
author_facet Cristi, Andrés
Oren, Sigal
contents We devise a general graph-theoretic framework for studying prophet inequalities. In this framework, an agent traverses a directed acyclic graph from a starting node $s$ to a target node $t$. Each edge has a value that is sampled from a known distribution. When the agent reaches a node $v$ it observes the realized values of all the outgoing edges from $v$. The agent's objective is to maximize the expected total value of the path it takes. As in prophet inequalities, we compare the agent's performance against a prophet who observes all the realizations of the edges' values ahead of time. Our analysis reveals that this ratio highly depends on the number of paths $k$ required to cover all the nodes in the graph. In particular, we provide an algorithm that guarantees a prophet inequality ratio of $\frac{1}{2k}$ and show an upper bound of $\frac{1}{k+1}$. Our framework captures planning problems in which there is uncertainty regarding the costs/benefits of each action. In particular, it captures an over-time variant of the classic prophet inequality in which a seller leases a durable item, such as an apartment, for $n$ time units. Each period a lessee appears and may have a different value for each lease term. We obtain a tight bound of $1/2$ for this variant. To make this framework even more expressive, we further generalize it to accommodate correlations between edges originating from the same node and allow for additional constraints on the edges the agent can take. The generalized framework captures many well-studied prophet inequality problems, including $d$-dimensional matching, $k$-prophet inequality, and more.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_13911
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Planning Against a Prophet: A Graph-Theoretic Framework for Making Sequential Decisions
Cristi, Andrés
Oren, Sigal
Computer Science and Game Theory
We devise a general graph-theoretic framework for studying prophet inequalities. In this framework, an agent traverses a directed acyclic graph from a starting node $s$ to a target node $t$. Each edge has a value that is sampled from a known distribution. When the agent reaches a node $v$ it observes the realized values of all the outgoing edges from $v$. The agent's objective is to maximize the expected total value of the path it takes. As in prophet inequalities, we compare the agent's performance against a prophet who observes all the realizations of the edges' values ahead of time. Our analysis reveals that this ratio highly depends on the number of paths $k$ required to cover all the nodes in the graph. In particular, we provide an algorithm that guarantees a prophet inequality ratio of $\frac{1}{2k}$ and show an upper bound of $\frac{1}{k+1}$. Our framework captures planning problems in which there is uncertainty regarding the costs/benefits of each action. In particular, it captures an over-time variant of the classic prophet inequality in which a seller leases a durable item, such as an apartment, for $n$ time units. Each period a lessee appears and may have a different value for each lease term. We obtain a tight bound of $1/2$ for this variant. To make this framework even more expressive, we further generalize it to accommodate correlations between edges originating from the same node and allow for additional constraints on the edges the agent can take. The generalized framework captures many well-studied prophet inequality problems, including $d$-dimensional matching, $k$-prophet inequality, and more.
title Planning Against a Prophet: A Graph-Theoretic Framework for Making Sequential Decisions
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.13911