Redistribution Through Market Segmentation
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arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866914560023199744 |
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| author | Augias, Victor Ghersengorin, Alexis Barreto, Daniel M. A. |
| author_facet | Augias, Victor Ghersengorin, Alexis Barreto, Daniel M. A. |
| contents | We study how to optimally segment monopolistic markets with a redistributive objective. We characterize optimal redistributive segmentations and show that they (i) induce the seller to price progressively, i.e., charge richer consumers higher prices than poorer ones, and (ii) may not maximize consumer surplus, instead granting extra profits to the monopolist. We further show that optimal redistributive segmentations are implementable via price-based regulation. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_14174 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Redistribution Through Market Segmentation Augias, Victor Ghersengorin, Alexis Barreto, Daniel M. A. Theoretical Economics We study how to optimally segment monopolistic markets with a redistributive objective. We characterize optimal redistributive segmentations and show that they (i) induce the seller to price progressively, i.e., charge richer consumers higher prices than poorer ones, and (ii) may not maximize consumer surplus, instead granting extra profits to the monopolist. We further show that optimal redistributive segmentations are implementable via price-based regulation. |
| title | Redistribution Through Market Segmentation |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.14174 |