Defending Against Sophisticated Poisoning Attacks with RL-based Aggregation in Federated Learning
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866915063171907584 |
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| author | Wang, Yujing Zhang, Hainan Wen, Sijia Qiu, Wangjie Guo, Binghui |
| author_facet | Wang, Yujing Zhang, Hainan Wen, Sijia Qiu, Wangjie Guo, Binghui |
| contents | Federated learning is highly susceptible to model poisoning attacks, especially those meticulously crafted for servers. Traditional defense methods mainly focus on updating assessments or robust aggregation against manually crafted myopic attacks. When facing advanced attacks, their defense stability is notably insufficient. Therefore, it is imperative to develop adaptive defenses against such advanced poisoning attacks. We find that benign clients exhibit significantly higher data distribution stability than malicious clients in federated learning in both CV and NLP tasks. Therefore, the malicious clients can be recognized by observing the stability of their data distribution. In this paper, we propose AdaAggRL, an RL-based Adaptive Aggregation method, to defend against sophisticated poisoning attacks. Specifically, we first utilize distribution learning to simulate the clients' data distributions. Then, we use the maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) to calculate the pairwise similarity of the current local model data distribution, its historical data distribution, and global model data distribution. Finally, we use policy learning to adaptively determine the aggregation weights based on the above similarities. Experiments on four real-world datasets demonstrate that the proposed defense model significantly outperforms widely adopted defense models for sophisticated attacks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_14217 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Defending Against Sophisticated Poisoning Attacks with RL-based Aggregation in Federated Learning Wang, Yujing Zhang, Hainan Wen, Sijia Qiu, Wangjie Guo, Binghui Machine Learning Cryptography and Security Federated learning is highly susceptible to model poisoning attacks, especially those meticulously crafted for servers. Traditional defense methods mainly focus on updating assessments or robust aggregation against manually crafted myopic attacks. When facing advanced attacks, their defense stability is notably insufficient. Therefore, it is imperative to develop adaptive defenses against such advanced poisoning attacks. We find that benign clients exhibit significantly higher data distribution stability than malicious clients in federated learning in both CV and NLP tasks. Therefore, the malicious clients can be recognized by observing the stability of their data distribution. In this paper, we propose AdaAggRL, an RL-based Adaptive Aggregation method, to defend against sophisticated poisoning attacks. Specifically, we first utilize distribution learning to simulate the clients' data distributions. Then, we use the maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) to calculate the pairwise similarity of the current local model data distribution, its historical data distribution, and global model data distribution. Finally, we use policy learning to adaptively determine the aggregation weights based on the above similarities. Experiments on four real-world datasets demonstrate that the proposed defense model significantly outperforms widely adopted defense models for sophisticated attacks. |
| title | Defending Against Sophisticated Poisoning Attacks with RL-based Aggregation in Federated Learning |
| topic | Machine Learning Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.14217 |