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Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake Protocols

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Ferreira, Matheus V. X., Ganesh, Aadityan, Hourigan, Jack, Huh, Hannah, Weinberg, S. Matthew, Yu, Catherine
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2024
Sujets:	Computer Science and Game Theory Cryptography and Security Theoretical Economics G.3
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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