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A Mechanism for Optimizing Media Recommender Systems

Fuente: arXiv

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Dettagli Bibliografici
Autore principale:	McFadden, Brian
Natura:	Preprint
Pubblicazione:	2024
Soggetti:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory Information Retrieval H.3.3; F.m
Accesso online:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Aggiungi Tag Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!

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