Information Revelation in Constant-Sum Games: Elections and Beyond
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866915685014175744 |
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| author | Kartik, Navin Squintani, Francesco Tinn, Katrin |
| author_facet | Kartik, Navin Squintani, Francesco Tinn, Katrin |
| contents | We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a "completeness" statistical condition, any "identifiable'" equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which office-motivated candidates possess private information about policy consequences. The ex-post property implies a sharp bound on information aggregation: equilibrium voter welfare is at best equal to the efficient use of a single candidate's information. In canonical specifications, politicians may "anti-pander" (overreact to their information), whereas some degree of pandering would be socially beneficial. We discuss other applications of the ex-post result. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_17084 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Information Revelation in Constant-Sum Games: Elections and Beyond Kartik, Navin Squintani, Francesco Tinn, Katrin Theoretical Economics We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a "completeness" statistical condition, any "identifiable'" equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which office-motivated candidates possess private information about policy consequences. The ex-post property implies a sharp bound on information aggregation: equilibrium voter welfare is at best equal to the efficient use of a single candidate's information. In canonical specifications, politicians may "anti-pander" (overreact to their information), whereas some degree of pandering would be socially beneficial. We discuss other applications of the ex-post result. |
| title | Information Revelation in Constant-Sum Games: Elections and Beyond |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.17084 |