Modal definability in Kripke's theory of truth
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866908284614606848 |
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| author | Walsh, James |
| author_facet | Walsh, James |
| contents | In Outline of a Theory of Truth, Kripke introduces some of the central concepts of the logical study of truth and paradox. He informally defines some of these -- such as groundedness and paradoxicality -- using modal locutions. We introduce a modal language for regimenting these informal definitions. Though groundedness and paradoxicality are expressible in the modal language, we prove that intrinsicality -- which Kripke emphasizes but does not define modally -- is not. We characterize the modally definable relations and completely axiomatize the modal semantics. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_17091 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Modal definability in Kripke's theory of truth Walsh, James Logic In Outline of a Theory of Truth, Kripke introduces some of the central concepts of the logical study of truth and paradox. He informally defines some of these -- such as groundedness and paradoxicality -- using modal locutions. We introduce a modal language for regimenting these informal definitions. Though groundedness and paradoxicality are expressible in the modal language, we prove that intrinsicality -- which Kripke emphasizes but does not define modally -- is not. We characterize the modally definable relations and completely axiomatize the modal semantics. |
| title | Modal definability in Kripke's theory of truth |
| topic | Logic |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.17091 |