Hiring and firing -- a signaling game
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866910500623745024 |
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| author | Ekström, Erik Tolonen-Weckström, Topias |
| author_facet | Ekström, Erik Tolonen-Weckström, Topias |
| contents | We study a signaling game between an employer and a potential employee, where the employee has private information regarding their production capacity. At the initial stage, the employee communicates a salary claim, after which the true production capacity is gradually revealed to the employer as the unknown drift of a Brownian motion representing the revenues generated by the employee. Subsequently, the employer has the possibility to choose a time to fire the employee in case the estimated production capacity falls short of the salary. In this set-up, we use filtering and optimal stopping theory to derive an equilibrium in which the employee provides a randomized salary claim and the employer uses a threshold strategy in terms of the conditional probability for the high production capacity. The analysis is robust in the sense that various extensions of the basic model can be solved using the same methodology, including cases with positive firing costs, incomplete information about one's own type, as well as an additional interview phase. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_17380 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Hiring and firing -- a signaling game Ekström, Erik Tolonen-Weckström, Topias Optimization and Control 91A15, 93E20 We study a signaling game between an employer and a potential employee, where the employee has private information regarding their production capacity. At the initial stage, the employee communicates a salary claim, after which the true production capacity is gradually revealed to the employer as the unknown drift of a Brownian motion representing the revenues generated by the employee. Subsequently, the employer has the possibility to choose a time to fire the employee in case the estimated production capacity falls short of the salary. In this set-up, we use filtering and optimal stopping theory to derive an equilibrium in which the employee provides a randomized salary claim and the employer uses a threshold strategy in terms of the conditional probability for the high production capacity. The analysis is robust in the sense that various extensions of the basic model can be solved using the same methodology, including cases with positive firing costs, incomplete information about one's own type, as well as an additional interview phase. |
| title | Hiring and firing -- a signaling game |
| topic | Optimization and Control 91A15, 93E20 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.17380 |