A Treatment of EIP-1559: Enhancing Transaction Fee Mechanism through Nth-Price Auction
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866909232429793280 |
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| author | Li, Kun Qi, Guangpeng Shang, Guangyong Deng, Wanli Xu, Minghui Cheng, Xiuzhen |
| author_facet | Li, Kun Qi, Guangpeng Shang, Guangyong Deng, Wanli Xu, Minghui Cheng, Xiuzhen |
| contents | With the widespread adoption of blockchain technology, the transaction fee mechanism (TFM) in blockchain systems has become a prominent research topic. An ideal TFM should satisfy user incentive compatibility (UIC), miner incentive compatibility (MIC), and miner-user side contract proofness ($c$-SCP). However, state-of-the-art works either fail to meet these three properties simultaneously or only satisfy them under certain conditions. In this paper, we propose a burning $N$-price auction TFM named BNP. This mechanism divides the transaction fee into a base fee, which is burned, and a priority fee, which is allocated to miners. Theoretical proofs and experimental analyses demonstrate that, even under conditions of significant transaction congestion, this mechanism satisfies UIC, MIC, and $c$-SCP simultaneously. Furthermore, the BNP mechanism is not constrained by the type of blockchain consensus, making it widely applicable. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_18957 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Treatment of EIP-1559: Enhancing Transaction Fee Mechanism through Nth-Price Auction Li, Kun Qi, Guangpeng Shang, Guangyong Deng, Wanli Xu, Minghui Cheng, Xiuzhen Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Computer Science and Game Theory With the widespread adoption of blockchain technology, the transaction fee mechanism (TFM) in blockchain systems has become a prominent research topic. An ideal TFM should satisfy user incentive compatibility (UIC), miner incentive compatibility (MIC), and miner-user side contract proofness ($c$-SCP). However, state-of-the-art works either fail to meet these three properties simultaneously or only satisfy them under certain conditions. In this paper, we propose a burning $N$-price auction TFM named BNP. This mechanism divides the transaction fee into a base fee, which is burned, and a priority fee, which is allocated to miners. Theoretical proofs and experimental analyses demonstrate that, even under conditions of significant transaction congestion, this mechanism satisfies UIC, MIC, and $c$-SCP simultaneously. Furthermore, the BNP mechanism is not constrained by the type of blockchain consensus, making it widely applicable. |
| title | A Treatment of EIP-1559: Enhancing Transaction Fee Mechanism through Nth-Price Auction |
| topic | Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.18957 |