Convex Choice
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866909232480124928 |
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| author | Kartik, Navin Kleiner, Andreas |
| author_facet | Kartik, Navin Kleiner, Andreas |
| contents | For multidimensional Euclidean type spaces, we study convex choice: from any choice set, the set of types that make the same choice is convex. We establish that, in a suitable sense, this property characterizes the sufficiency of local incentive constraints. Convex choice is also of interest more broadly. We tie convex choice to a notion of directional single-crossing differences (DSCD). For an expected-utility agent choosing among lotteries, DSCD implies that preferences are either one-dimensional or must take the affine form that has been tractable in multidimensional mechanism design. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_19063 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Convex Choice Kartik, Navin Kleiner, Andreas Theoretical Economics For multidimensional Euclidean type spaces, we study convex choice: from any choice set, the set of types that make the same choice is convex. We establish that, in a suitable sense, this property characterizes the sufficiency of local incentive constraints. Convex choice is also of interest more broadly. We tie convex choice to a notion of directional single-crossing differences (DSCD). For an expected-utility agent choosing among lotteries, DSCD implies that preferences are either one-dimensional or must take the affine form that has been tractable in multidimensional mechanism design. |
| title | Convex Choice |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.19063 |