ASCENT: Amplifying Power Side-Channel Resilience via Learning & Monte-Carlo Tree Search

Fuente: arXiv
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Bhandari, Jitendra, Chowdhury, Animesh Basak, Nabeel, Mohammed, Sinanoglu, Ozgur, Garg, Siddharth, Karri, Ramesh, Knechtel, Johann
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
Subjects:
Online Access:
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866914852151230464
author Bhandari, Jitendra
Chowdhury, Animesh Basak
Nabeel, Mohammed
Sinanoglu, Ozgur
Garg, Siddharth
Karri, Ramesh
Knechtel, Johann
author_facet Bhandari, Jitendra
Chowdhury, Animesh Basak
Nabeel, Mohammed
Sinanoglu, Ozgur
Garg, Siddharth
Karri, Ramesh
Knechtel, Johann
contents Power side-channel (PSC) analysis is pivotal for securing cryptographic hardware. Prior art focused on securing gate-level netlists obtained as-is from chip design automation, neglecting all the complexities and potential side-effects for security arising from the design automation process. That is, automation traditionally prioritizes power, performance, and area (PPA), sidelining security. We propose a "security-first" approach, refining the logic synthesis stage to enhance the overall resilience of PSC countermeasures. We introduce ASCENT, a learning-and-search-based framework that (i) drastically reduces the time for post-design PSC evaluation and (ii) explores the security-vs-PPA design space. Thus, ASCENT enables an efficient exploration of a large number of candidate netlists, leading to an improvement in PSC resilience compared to regular PPA-optimized netlists. ASCENT is up to 120x faster than traditional PSC analysis and yields a 3.11x improvement for PSC resilience of state-of-the-art PSC countermeasures
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_19549
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle ASCENT: Amplifying Power Side-Channel Resilience via Learning & Monte-Carlo Tree Search
Bhandari, Jitendra
Chowdhury, Animesh Basak
Nabeel, Mohammed
Sinanoglu, Ozgur
Garg, Siddharth
Karri, Ramesh
Knechtel, Johann
Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
Power side-channel (PSC) analysis is pivotal for securing cryptographic hardware. Prior art focused on securing gate-level netlists obtained as-is from chip design automation, neglecting all the complexities and potential side-effects for security arising from the design automation process. That is, automation traditionally prioritizes power, performance, and area (PPA), sidelining security. We propose a "security-first" approach, refining the logic synthesis stage to enhance the overall resilience of PSC countermeasures. We introduce ASCENT, a learning-and-search-based framework that (i) drastically reduces the time for post-design PSC evaluation and (ii) explores the security-vs-PPA design space. Thus, ASCENT enables an efficient exploration of a large number of candidate netlists, leading to an improvement in PSC resilience compared to regular PPA-optimized netlists. ASCENT is up to 120x faster than traditional PSC analysis and yields a 3.11x improvement for PSC resilience of state-of-the-art PSC countermeasures
title ASCENT: Amplifying Power Side-Channel Resilience via Learning & Monte-Carlo Tree Search
topic Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.19549