Committee Monotonicity and Proportional Representation for Ranked Preferences
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866929749789507584 |
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| author | Aziz, Haris Lederer, Patrick Peters, Dominik Peters, Jannik Ritossa, Angus |
| author_facet | Aziz, Haris Lederer, Patrick Peters, Dominik Peters, Jannik Ritossa, Angus |
| contents | We study committee voting rules under ranked preferences, which map the voters' preference relations to a subset of the alternatives of predefined size. In this setting, the compatibility between proportional representation and committee monotonicity is a fundamental open problem that has been mentioned in several works. We address this research question by designing a new committee voting rule called the Solid Coalition Refinement (SCR) rule that simultaneously satisfies committee monotonicity and Dummett's Proportionality for Solid Coalitions (PSC) property as well as one of its variants called inclusion PSC. This is the first rule known to satisfy both of these properties. Moreover, we show that this is effectively the best that we can hope for as other fairness notions adapted from approval voting are incompatible with committee monotonicity. For truncated preferences, we prove that the SCR rule still satisfies PSC and a property called independence of losing voter blocs, thereby refuting a conjecture of Graham-Squire et al. (2024). Finally, we discuss the consequences of our results in the context of rank aggregation. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_19689 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Committee Monotonicity and Proportional Representation for Ranked Preferences Aziz, Haris Lederer, Patrick Peters, Dominik Peters, Jannik Ritossa, Angus Computer Science and Game Theory We study committee voting rules under ranked preferences, which map the voters' preference relations to a subset of the alternatives of predefined size. In this setting, the compatibility between proportional representation and committee monotonicity is a fundamental open problem that has been mentioned in several works. We address this research question by designing a new committee voting rule called the Solid Coalition Refinement (SCR) rule that simultaneously satisfies committee monotonicity and Dummett's Proportionality for Solid Coalitions (PSC) property as well as one of its variants called inclusion PSC. This is the first rule known to satisfy both of these properties. Moreover, we show that this is effectively the best that we can hope for as other fairness notions adapted from approval voting are incompatible with committee monotonicity. For truncated preferences, we prove that the SCR rule still satisfies PSC and a property called independence of losing voter blocs, thereby refuting a conjecture of Graham-Squire et al. (2024). Finally, we discuss the consequences of our results in the context of rank aggregation. |
| title | Committee Monotonicity and Proportional Representation for Ranked Preferences |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.19689 |