Common Identification and Common Learning
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866913407875153920 |
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| author | Cripps, Martin W. |
| author_facet | Cripps, Martin W. |
| contents | Cripps, Ely, Mailath and Samuelson (2008) showed that if there are finitely many states, and the signals are i.i.d and finite, then individual learning is sufficient for common learning. In this note we describe what is commonly learned when this sufficient condition does not hold. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_20029 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Common Identification and Common Learning Cripps, Martin W. Theoretical Economics Cripps, Ely, Mailath and Samuelson (2008) showed that if there are finitely many states, and the signals are i.i.d and finite, then individual learning is sufficient for common learning. In this note we describe what is commonly learned when this sufficient condition does not hold. |
| title | Common Identification and Common Learning |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.20029 |