Single Transferable Vote and Paradoxes of Negative and Positive Involvement

Fuente: arXiv
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1. Verfasser: McCune, David
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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_version_ 1866910711833165824
author McCune, David
author_facet McCune, David
contents We analyze a type of voting paradox which we term an involvement paradox, in which a candidate who loses an election could be made into a winner if more of the candidate's non-supporters participated in the election, or a winner could be made into a loser if more of the candidate's supporters participated. Such paradoxical outcomes are possible under the voting method of single transferable vote (STV), which is widely used for political elections throughout the world. We provide a worst-case analysis of involvement paradoxes under STV and show several interesting examples of these paradoxes from elections in Scotland.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2406_20045
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Single Transferable Vote and Paradoxes of Negative and Positive Involvement
McCune, David
General Economics
Economics
We analyze a type of voting paradox which we term an involvement paradox, in which a candidate who loses an election could be made into a winner if more of the candidate's non-supporters participated in the election, or a winner could be made into a loser if more of the candidate's supporters participated. Such paradoxical outcomes are possible under the voting method of single transferable vote (STV), which is widely used for political elections throughout the world. We provide a worst-case analysis of involvement paradoxes under STV and show several interesting examples of these paradoxes from elections in Scotland.
title Single Transferable Vote and Paradoxes of Negative and Positive Involvement
topic General Economics
Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.20045