Counterexamples to "Transitive Regret"

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Chang, Yuan, Liu, Shuo Li
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author Chang, Yuan
Liu, Shuo Li
author_facet Chang, Yuan
Liu, Shuo Li
contents Theorem 1 in Bikhchandani & Segal (2011; Theoretical Economics) suggests that a complete, transitive, monotonic, and continuous preference is regret based if and only if it is expected utility. Their Proposition 1 suggests that transitivity and continuity of a regret-based preference implies an equivalence condition: if random variables $X$ and $Y$ have the same distribution, then $X\sim Y$. We give counterexamples to Proposition 1.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_00055
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Counterexamples to "Transitive Regret"
Chang, Yuan
Liu, Shuo Li
Theoretical Economics
Theorem 1 in Bikhchandani & Segal (2011; Theoretical Economics) suggests that a complete, transitive, monotonic, and continuous preference is regret based if and only if it is expected utility. Their Proposition 1 suggests that transitivity and continuity of a regret-based preference implies an equivalence condition: if random variables $X$ and $Y$ have the same distribution, then $X\sim Y$. We give counterexamples to Proposition 1.
title Counterexamples to "Transitive Regret"
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.00055