Nash equilibria of games with generalized complementarities

Fuente: arXiv
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Autor principal: Yu, Lu
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2024
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author Yu, Lu
author_facet Yu, Lu
contents To generalize complementarities for games, we introduce some conditions weaker than quasisupermodularity and the single crossing property. We prove that the Nash equilibria of a game satisfying these conditions form a nonempty complete lattice. This is a purely order-theoretic generalization of Zhou's theorem.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_00636
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Nash equilibria of games with generalized complementarities
Yu, Lu
Theoretical Economics
To generalize complementarities for games, we introduce some conditions weaker than quasisupermodularity and the single crossing property. We prove that the Nash equilibria of a game satisfying these conditions form a nonempty complete lattice. This is a purely order-theoretic generalization of Zhou's theorem.
title Nash equilibria of games with generalized complementarities
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.00636