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An Efficient and Sybil Attack Resistant Voting Mechanism

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal:	Lenzi, Jeremias
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2024
Sujets:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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