Breach By A Thousand Leaks: Unsafe Information Leakage in `Safe' AI Responses
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866916460456050688 |
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| author | Glukhov, David Han, Ziwen Shumailov, Ilia Papyan, Vardan Papernot, Nicolas |
| author_facet | Glukhov, David Han, Ziwen Shumailov, Ilia Papyan, Vardan Papernot, Nicolas |
| contents | Vulnerability of Frontier language models to misuse and jailbreaks has prompted the development of safety measures like filters and alignment training in an effort to ensure safety through robustness to adversarially crafted prompts. We assert that robustness is fundamentally insufficient for ensuring safety goals, and current defenses and evaluation methods fail to account for risks of dual-intent queries and their composition for malicious goals. To quantify these risks, we introduce a new safety evaluation framework based on impermissible information leakage of model outputs and demonstrate how our proposed question-decomposition attack can extract dangerous knowledge from a censored LLM more effectively than traditional jailbreaking. Underlying our proposed evaluation method is a novel information-theoretic threat model of inferential adversaries, distinguished from security adversaries, such as jailbreaks, in that success is measured by inferring impermissible knowledge from victim outputs as opposed to forcing explicitly impermissible outputs from the victim. Through our information-theoretic framework, we show that to ensure safety against inferential adversaries, defense mechanisms must ensure information censorship, bounding the leakage of impermissible information. However, we prove that such defenses inevitably incur a safety-utility trade-off. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_02551 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Breach By A Thousand Leaks: Unsafe Information Leakage in `Safe' AI Responses Glukhov, David Han, Ziwen Shumailov, Ilia Papyan, Vardan Papernot, Nicolas Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Computers and Society Vulnerability of Frontier language models to misuse and jailbreaks has prompted the development of safety measures like filters and alignment training in an effort to ensure safety through robustness to adversarially crafted prompts. We assert that robustness is fundamentally insufficient for ensuring safety goals, and current defenses and evaluation methods fail to account for risks of dual-intent queries and their composition for malicious goals. To quantify these risks, we introduce a new safety evaluation framework based on impermissible information leakage of model outputs and demonstrate how our proposed question-decomposition attack can extract dangerous knowledge from a censored LLM more effectively than traditional jailbreaking. Underlying our proposed evaluation method is a novel information-theoretic threat model of inferential adversaries, distinguished from security adversaries, such as jailbreaks, in that success is measured by inferring impermissible knowledge from victim outputs as opposed to forcing explicitly impermissible outputs from the victim. Through our information-theoretic framework, we show that to ensure safety against inferential adversaries, defense mechanisms must ensure information censorship, bounding the leakage of impermissible information. However, we prove that such defenses inevitably incur a safety-utility trade-off. |
| title | Breach By A Thousand Leaks: Unsafe Information Leakage in `Safe' AI Responses |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Computers and Society |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.02551 |