Information Greenhouse: Optimal Persuasion for Medical Test-Avoiders
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866914546667487232 |
|---|---|
| author | Chen, Zhuo |
| author_facet | Chen, Zhuo |
| contents | Patients often avoid medical tests because testing produces not only useful information but also painful beliefs. This paper studies optimal communication between a doctor and an information-avoidant patient who first decides whether to take a test and, after an unfavorable result, whether to accept treatment. The doctor can disclose information about how severe non-treatment would be if the patient is sick. The main tension is between warning and reassurance. A warning can make treatment compelling after diagnosis, but reassurance can make testing acceptable by preserving hope about the untreated prospect. I characterize the optimal policy. When the warning that supports treatment is compatible with testing, the doctor uses warning-in-advance. When such warning would deter testing, the doctor constructs an information greenhouse: a committed post-test information environment that reassures the patient about the untreated prospect. With voluntary consultation, reassurance must sometimes be moved before the test as precautionary comfort. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_02948 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Information Greenhouse: Optimal Persuasion for Medical Test-Avoiders Chen, Zhuo Theoretical Economics Patients often avoid medical tests because testing produces not only useful information but also painful beliefs. This paper studies optimal communication between a doctor and an information-avoidant patient who first decides whether to take a test and, after an unfavorable result, whether to accept treatment. The doctor can disclose information about how severe non-treatment would be if the patient is sick. The main tension is between warning and reassurance. A warning can make treatment compelling after diagnosis, but reassurance can make testing acceptable by preserving hope about the untreated prospect. I characterize the optimal policy. When the warning that supports treatment is compatible with testing, the doctor uses warning-in-advance. When such warning would deter testing, the doctor constructs an information greenhouse: a committed post-test information environment that reassures the patient about the untreated prospect. With voluntary consultation, reassurance must sometimes be moved before the test as precautionary comfort. |
| title | Information Greenhouse: Optimal Persuasion for Medical Test-Avoiders |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.02948 |