Venomancer: Towards Imperceptible and Target-on-Demand Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Nguyen, Son, Nguyen, Thinh, Doan, Khoa D, Wong, Kok-Seng
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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author Nguyen, Son
Nguyen, Thinh
Doan, Khoa D
Wong, Kok-Seng
author_facet Nguyen, Son
Nguyen, Thinh
Doan, Khoa D
Wong, Kok-Seng
contents Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed machine learning approach that maintains data privacy by training on decentralized data sources. Similar to centralized machine learning, FL is also susceptible to backdoor attacks, where an attacker can compromise some clients by injecting a backdoor trigger into local models of those clients, leading to the global model's behavior being manipulated as desired by the attacker. Most backdoor attacks in FL assume a predefined target class and require control over a large number of clients or knowledge of benign clients' information. Furthermore, they are not imperceptible and are easily detected by human inspection due to clear artifacts left on the poison data. To overcome these challenges, we propose Venomancer, an effective backdoor attack that is imperceptible and allows target-on-demand. Specifically, imperceptibility is achieved by using a visual loss function to make the poison data visually indistinguishable from the original data. Target-on-demand property allows the attacker to choose arbitrary target classes via conditional adversarial training. Additionally, experiments showed that the method is robust against state-of-the-art defenses such as Norm Clipping, Weak DP, Krum, Multi-Krum, RLR, FedRAD, Deepsight, and RFLBAT. The source code is available at https://github.com/nguyenhongson1902/Venomancer.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_03144
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Venomancer: Towards Imperceptible and Target-on-Demand Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning
Nguyen, Son
Nguyen, Thinh
Doan, Khoa D
Wong, Kok-Seng
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed machine learning approach that maintains data privacy by training on decentralized data sources. Similar to centralized machine learning, FL is also susceptible to backdoor attacks, where an attacker can compromise some clients by injecting a backdoor trigger into local models of those clients, leading to the global model's behavior being manipulated as desired by the attacker. Most backdoor attacks in FL assume a predefined target class and require control over a large number of clients or knowledge of benign clients' information. Furthermore, they are not imperceptible and are easily detected by human inspection due to clear artifacts left on the poison data. To overcome these challenges, we propose Venomancer, an effective backdoor attack that is imperceptible and allows target-on-demand. Specifically, imperceptibility is achieved by using a visual loss function to make the poison data visually indistinguishable from the original data. Target-on-demand property allows the attacker to choose arbitrary target classes via conditional adversarial training. Additionally, experiments showed that the method is robust against state-of-the-art defenses such as Norm Clipping, Weak DP, Krum, Multi-Krum, RLR, FedRAD, Deepsight, and RFLBAT. The source code is available at https://github.com/nguyenhongson1902/Venomancer.
title Venomancer: Towards Imperceptible and Target-on-Demand Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning
topic Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.03144