T2IShield: Defending Against Backdoors on Text-to-Image Diffusion Models
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866914874213269504 |
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| author | Wang, Zhongqi Zhang, Jie Shan, Shiguang Chen, Xilin |
| author_facet | Wang, Zhongqi Zhang, Jie Shan, Shiguang Chen, Xilin |
| contents | While text-to-image diffusion models demonstrate impressive generation capabilities, they also exhibit vulnerability to backdoor attacks, which involve the manipulation of model outputs through malicious triggers. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a comprehensive defense method named T2IShield to detect, localize, and mitigate such attacks. Specifically, we find the "Assimilation Phenomenon" on the cross-attention maps caused by the backdoor trigger. Based on this key insight, we propose two effective backdoor detection methods: Frobenius Norm Threshold Truncation and Covariance Discriminant Analysis. Besides, we introduce a binary-search approach to localize the trigger within a backdoor sample and assess the efficacy of existing concept editing methods in mitigating backdoor attacks. Empirical evaluations on two advanced backdoor attack scenarios show the effectiveness of our proposed defense method. For backdoor sample detection, T2IShield achieves a detection F1 score of 88.9$\%$ with low computational cost. Furthermore, T2IShield achieves a localization F1 score of 86.4$\%$ and invalidates 99$\%$ poisoned samples. Codes are released at https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/T2IShield. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_04215 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | T2IShield: Defending Against Backdoors on Text-to-Image Diffusion Models Wang, Zhongqi Zhang, Jie Shan, Shiguang Chen, Xilin Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition While text-to-image diffusion models demonstrate impressive generation capabilities, they also exhibit vulnerability to backdoor attacks, which involve the manipulation of model outputs through malicious triggers. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a comprehensive defense method named T2IShield to detect, localize, and mitigate such attacks. Specifically, we find the "Assimilation Phenomenon" on the cross-attention maps caused by the backdoor trigger. Based on this key insight, we propose two effective backdoor detection methods: Frobenius Norm Threshold Truncation and Covariance Discriminant Analysis. Besides, we introduce a binary-search approach to localize the trigger within a backdoor sample and assess the efficacy of existing concept editing methods in mitigating backdoor attacks. Empirical evaluations on two advanced backdoor attack scenarios show the effectiveness of our proposed defense method. For backdoor sample detection, T2IShield achieves a detection F1 score of 88.9$\%$ with low computational cost. Furthermore, T2IShield achieves a localization F1 score of 86.4$\%$ and invalidates 99$\%$ poisoned samples. Codes are released at https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/T2IShield. |
| title | T2IShield: Defending Against Backdoors on Text-to-Image Diffusion Models |
| topic | Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.04215 |