Differentially Private Inductive Miner
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866908072787574784 |
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| author | Schulze, Max Zisgen, Yorck Kirschte, Moritz Mohammadi, Esfandiar Koschmider, Agnes |
| author_facet | Schulze, Max Zisgen, Yorck Kirschte, Moritz Mohammadi, Esfandiar Koschmider, Agnes |
| contents | Protecting personal data about individuals, such as event traces in process mining, is an inherently difficult task since an event trace leaks information about the path in a process model that an individual has triggered. Yet, prior anonymization methods of event traces like k-anonymity or event log sanitization struggled to protect against such leakage, in particular against adversaries with sufficient background knowledge. In this work, we provide a method that tackles the challenge of summarizing sensitive event traces by learning the underlying process tree in a privacy-preserving manner. We prove via the so-called Differential Privacy (DP) property that from the resulting summaries no useful inference can be drawn about any personal data in an event trace. On the technical side, we introduce a differentially private approximation (DPIM) of the Inductive Miner. Experimentally, we compare our DPIM with the Inductive Miner on 14 real-world event traces by evaluating well-known metrics: fitness, precision, simplicity, and generalization. The experiments show that our DPIM not only protects personal data but also generates faithful process trees that exhibit little utility loss above the Inductive Miner. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_04595 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Differentially Private Inductive Miner Schulze, Max Zisgen, Yorck Kirschte, Moritz Mohammadi, Esfandiar Koschmider, Agnes Cryptography and Security Databases Protecting personal data about individuals, such as event traces in process mining, is an inherently difficult task since an event trace leaks information about the path in a process model that an individual has triggered. Yet, prior anonymization methods of event traces like k-anonymity or event log sanitization struggled to protect against such leakage, in particular against adversaries with sufficient background knowledge. In this work, we provide a method that tackles the challenge of summarizing sensitive event traces by learning the underlying process tree in a privacy-preserving manner. We prove via the so-called Differential Privacy (DP) property that from the resulting summaries no useful inference can be drawn about any personal data in an event trace. On the technical side, we introduce a differentially private approximation (DPIM) of the Inductive Miner. Experimentally, we compare our DPIM with the Inductive Miner on 14 real-world event traces by evaluating well-known metrics: fitness, precision, simplicity, and generalization. The experiments show that our DPIM not only protects personal data but also generates faithful process trees that exhibit little utility loss above the Inductive Miner. |
| title | Differentially Private Inductive Miner |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Databases |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.04595 |