A game theory analysis of decentralized epidemic management with opinion dynamics
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866914859974656000 |
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| author | De Silva, Olivier Lindamulage Lasaulce, Samson Morarescu, Irinel-Constantin Varma, Vineeth S. |
| author_facet | De Silva, Olivier Lindamulage Lasaulce, Samson Morarescu, Irinel-Constantin Varma, Vineeth S. |
| contents | In this paper, we introduce a static game that allows one to numerically assess the loss of efficiency induced by decentralized control or management of a global epidemic. Each player represents a region which is assumed to choose its control to implement a tradeoff between socio-economic aspects and health aspects; the control comprises both epidemic control physical measures and influence actions on the region opinion. The Generalized Nash equilibrium $(\mathrm{GNE})$ analysis of the proposed game model is conducted. The direct analysis of this game of practical interest is non-trivial but it turns out that one can construct an auxiliary game which allows one: to prove existence and uniqueness; to compute the GNE and the optimal centralized solution (sum-cost) of the game. These results allow us to assess numerically the loss (measured in terms of Price of Anarchy ($\mathrm{PoA}$)) induced by decentralization with or without taking into account the opinion dynamics. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_05020 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A game theory analysis of decentralized epidemic management with opinion dynamics De Silva, Olivier Lindamulage Lasaulce, Samson Morarescu, Irinel-Constantin Varma, Vineeth S. Systems and Control In this paper, we introduce a static game that allows one to numerically assess the loss of efficiency induced by decentralized control or management of a global epidemic. Each player represents a region which is assumed to choose its control to implement a tradeoff between socio-economic aspects and health aspects; the control comprises both epidemic control physical measures and influence actions on the region opinion. The Generalized Nash equilibrium $(\mathrm{GNE})$ analysis of the proposed game model is conducted. The direct analysis of this game of practical interest is non-trivial but it turns out that one can construct an auxiliary game which allows one: to prove existence and uniqueness; to compute the GNE and the optimal centralized solution (sum-cost) of the game. These results allow us to assess numerically the loss (measured in terms of Price of Anarchy ($\mathrm{PoA}$)) induced by decentralization with or without taking into account the opinion dynamics. |
| title | A game theory analysis of decentralized epidemic management with opinion dynamics |
| topic | Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.05020 |