Collective Upkeep
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866910807693983744 |
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| author | Madsen, Erik Shmaya, Eran |
| author_facet | Madsen, Erik Shmaya, Eran |
| contents | We design mechanisms for maintaining public goods which require periodic in-kind contributions, motivated by incentives problems facing crowd-sourced recommender systems. Utilitarian welfare is maximized by redistributive policies which are infeasible when group members can leave or misreport their preferences. An optimal mechanism reduces contributions for group members with low benefit-cost ratios to encourage participation; and pairs reduced contributions with restricted access to the good to ensure truthful reporting. At most two membership tiers are offered at the optimum, indicating that ecommerce and digital content platforms may benefit substantially from offering simple user-adjustable recommendation settings. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_05196 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Collective Upkeep Madsen, Erik Shmaya, Eran Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory We design mechanisms for maintaining public goods which require periodic in-kind contributions, motivated by incentives problems facing crowd-sourced recommender systems. Utilitarian welfare is maximized by redistributive policies which are infeasible when group members can leave or misreport their preferences. An optimal mechanism reduces contributions for group members with low benefit-cost ratios to encourage participation; and pairs reduced contributions with restricted access to the good to ensure truthful reporting. At most two membership tiers are offered at the optimum, indicating that ecommerce and digital content platforms may benefit substantially from offering simple user-adjustable recommendation settings. |
| title | Collective Upkeep |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.05196 |