Stochastic Linear-Quadratic Stackelberg Differential Game with Asymmetric Informational Uncertainties: Robust Optimization Approach

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Xiang, Na, Shi, Jingtao
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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author Xiang, Na
Shi, Jingtao
author_facet Xiang, Na
Shi, Jingtao
contents This paper is concerned with a two-person zero-sum indefinite stochastic linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric informational uncertainties, where both the leader and follower face different and unknown disturbances. We take a robust optimization approach and soft-constraint analysis, a min-max stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem is solved by the follower firstly. Then, the leader deal with a max-min stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem of forward-backward stochastic differential equations in an augmented space. State feedback representation of the robust Stackelberg equilibrium is given in a more explicit form by decoupling technique, via some Riccati equations.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_05728
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Stochastic Linear-Quadratic Stackelberg Differential Game with Asymmetric Informational Uncertainties: Robust Optimization Approach
Xiang, Na
Shi, Jingtao
Optimization and Control
93E20, 60H10, 91A15, 91A65
This paper is concerned with a two-person zero-sum indefinite stochastic linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric informational uncertainties, where both the leader and follower face different and unknown disturbances. We take a robust optimization approach and soft-constraint analysis, a min-max stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem is solved by the follower firstly. Then, the leader deal with a max-min stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem of forward-backward stochastic differential equations in an augmented space. State feedback representation of the robust Stackelberg equilibrium is given in a more explicit form by decoupling technique, via some Riccati equations.
title Stochastic Linear-Quadratic Stackelberg Differential Game with Asymmetric Informational Uncertainties: Robust Optimization Approach
topic Optimization and Control
93E20, 60H10, 91A15, 91A65
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.05728