Distribution System Reconfiguration to Mitigate Load Altering Attacks via Stackelberg Games
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866912674392047616 |
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| author | Maleki, Sajjad Belmaga, E. Veronica Konstantinou, Charalambos Lakshminarayana, Subhash |
| author_facet | Maleki, Sajjad Belmaga, E. Veronica Konstantinou, Charalambos Lakshminarayana, Subhash |
| contents | The widespread integration of IoT-controllable devices (e.g., smart EV charging stations and heat pumps) into modern power systems enhances capabilities but introduces critical cybersecurity risks. Specifically, these devices are susceptible to load-altering attacks (LAAs) that can compromise power system safety. This paper quantifies the impact of LAAs on nodal voltage constraint violations in distribution networks (DNs). We first present closed-form expressions to analytically characterize LAA effects and quantify the minimum number of compromised devices for a successful LAA. Based on these insights, we propose a reactive defense mechanism that mitigates LAAs through DN reconfiguration. To address strategic adversaries, we then formulate defense strategies using a non-cooperative sequential game, which models the knowledgeable and strategic attacker, accounting for the worst-case scenario and enabling the reactive defender to devise an efficient and robust defense. Further, our formulation also accounts for uncertainties in attack localization. A novel Bayesian optimization approach is introduced to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium, significantly reducing computational burden efficiently. The game-theoretic strategy effectively mitigates the attack's impact while ensuring minimal system reconfiguration. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_07065 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Distribution System Reconfiguration to Mitigate Load Altering Attacks via Stackelberg Games Maleki, Sajjad Belmaga, E. Veronica Konstantinou, Charalambos Lakshminarayana, Subhash Systems and Control The widespread integration of IoT-controllable devices (e.g., smart EV charging stations and heat pumps) into modern power systems enhances capabilities but introduces critical cybersecurity risks. Specifically, these devices are susceptible to load-altering attacks (LAAs) that can compromise power system safety. This paper quantifies the impact of LAAs on nodal voltage constraint violations in distribution networks (DNs). We first present closed-form expressions to analytically characterize LAA effects and quantify the minimum number of compromised devices for a successful LAA. Based on these insights, we propose a reactive defense mechanism that mitigates LAAs through DN reconfiguration. To address strategic adversaries, we then formulate defense strategies using a non-cooperative sequential game, which models the knowledgeable and strategic attacker, accounting for the worst-case scenario and enabling the reactive defender to devise an efficient and robust defense. Further, our formulation also accounts for uncertainties in attack localization. A novel Bayesian optimization approach is introduced to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium, significantly reducing computational burden efficiently. The game-theoretic strategy effectively mitigates the attack's impact while ensuring minimal system reconfiguration. |
| title | Distribution System Reconfiguration to Mitigate Load Altering Attacks via Stackelberg Games |
| topic | Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.07065 |