The Pass-through of Retail Crime

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Hase, Carl, Kasinger, Johannes
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2024
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author Hase, Carl
Kasinger, Johannes
author_facet Hase, Carl
Kasinger, Johannes
contents This paper shows that retailers increase prices in response to organized retail crime. We match store-level crime data to scanner data from the universe of transactions for cannabis retailers in Washington state. Using quasi-experimental variation from robberies and burglaries, we find a 1.5-1.8% price increase at victimized stores and nearby competitors. This rise is not driven by short-to-medium-term demand changes but is consistent with an own-cost shock. Effects are larger for independent stores and less concentrated markets. We estimate that crime imposes a 1% "hidden" unit tax on affected stores, implying $33.9 million additional social costs, primarily borne by consumers.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_07201
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle The Pass-through of Retail Crime
Hase, Carl
Kasinger, Johannes
General Economics
Economics
This paper shows that retailers increase prices in response to organized retail crime. We match store-level crime data to scanner data from the universe of transactions for cannabis retailers in Washington state. Using quasi-experimental variation from robberies and burglaries, we find a 1.5-1.8% price increase at victimized stores and nearby competitors. This rise is not driven by short-to-medium-term demand changes but is consistent with an own-cost shock. Effects are larger for independent stores and less concentrated markets. We estimate that crime imposes a 1% "hidden" unit tax on affected stores, implying $33.9 million additional social costs, primarily borne by consumers.
title The Pass-through of Retail Crime
topic General Economics
Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.07201