Mitigating Backdoor Attacks using Activation-Guided Model Editing
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866910624797163520 |
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| author | Hsieh, Felix Nguyen, Huy H. MaungMaung, AprilPyone Usynin, Dmitrii Echizen, Isao |
| author_facet | Hsieh, Felix Nguyen, Huy H. MaungMaung, AprilPyone Usynin, Dmitrii Echizen, Isao |
| contents | Backdoor attacks compromise the integrity and reliability of machine learning models by embedding a hidden trigger during the training process, which can later be activated to cause unintended misbehavior. We propose a novel backdoor mitigation approach via machine unlearning to counter such backdoor attacks. The proposed method utilizes model activation of domain-equivalent unseen data to guide the editing of the model's weights. Unlike the previous unlearning-based mitigation methods, ours is computationally inexpensive and achieves state-of-the-art performance while only requiring a handful of unseen samples for unlearning. In addition, we also point out that unlearning the backdoor may cause the whole targeted class to be unlearned, thus introducing an additional repair step to preserve the model's utility after editing the model. Experiment results show that the proposed method is effective in unlearning the backdoor on different datasets and trigger patterns. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_07662 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Mitigating Backdoor Attacks using Activation-Guided Model Editing Hsieh, Felix Nguyen, Huy H. MaungMaung, AprilPyone Usynin, Dmitrii Echizen, Isao Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Cryptography and Security Backdoor attacks compromise the integrity and reliability of machine learning models by embedding a hidden trigger during the training process, which can later be activated to cause unintended misbehavior. We propose a novel backdoor mitigation approach via machine unlearning to counter such backdoor attacks. The proposed method utilizes model activation of domain-equivalent unseen data to guide the editing of the model's weights. Unlike the previous unlearning-based mitigation methods, ours is computationally inexpensive and achieves state-of-the-art performance while only requiring a handful of unseen samples for unlearning. In addition, we also point out that unlearning the backdoor may cause the whole targeted class to be unlearned, thus introducing an additional repair step to preserve the model's utility after editing the model. Experiment results show that the proposed method is effective in unlearning the backdoor on different datasets and trigger patterns. |
| title | Mitigating Backdoor Attacks using Activation-Guided Model Editing |
| topic | Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.07662 |