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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Della Penna, Nicolas
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.07845
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author Della Penna, Nicolas
author_facet Della Penna, Nicolas
contents Practical mechanisms often limit agent reports to constrained formats like trades or orderings, potentially limiting the information agents can express. We propose a novel class of mechanisms that elicit agent reports in natural language and leverage the world-modeling capabilities of large language models (LLMs) to select outcomes and assign payoffs. We identify sufficient conditions for these mechanisms to be incentive-compatible and efficient as the LLM being a good enough world model and a strong inter-agent information over-determination condition. We show situations where these LM-based mechanisms can successfully aggregate information in signal structures on which prediction markets fail.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_07845
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Natural Language Mechanisms via Self-Resolution with Foundation Models
Della Penna, Nicolas
Computer Science and Game Theory
Practical mechanisms often limit agent reports to constrained formats like trades or orderings, potentially limiting the information agents can express. We propose a novel class of mechanisms that elicit agent reports in natural language and leverage the world-modeling capabilities of large language models (LLMs) to select outcomes and assign payoffs. We identify sufficient conditions for these mechanisms to be incentive-compatible and efficient as the LLM being a good enough world model and a strong inter-agent information over-determination condition. We show situations where these LM-based mechanisms can successfully aggregate information in signal structures on which prediction markets fail.
title Natural Language Mechanisms via Self-Resolution with Foundation Models
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.07845