AoA-Based Physical Layer Authentication in Analog Arrays under Impersonation Attacks

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Srinivasan, Muralikrishnan, Senigagliesi, Linda, Chen, Hui, Chorti, Arsenia, Baldi, Marco, Wymeersch, Henk
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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author Srinivasan, Muralikrishnan
Senigagliesi, Linda
Chen, Hui
Chorti, Arsenia
Baldi, Marco
Wymeersch, Henk
author_facet Srinivasan, Muralikrishnan
Senigagliesi, Linda
Chen, Hui
Chorti, Arsenia
Baldi, Marco
Wymeersch, Henk
contents We discuss the use of angle of arrival (AoA) as an authentication measure in analog array multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems. A base station equipped with an analog array authenticates users based on the AoA estimated from certified pilot transmissions, while active attackers manipulate their transmitted signals to mount impersonation attacks. We study several attacks of increasing intensity (captured through the availability of side information at the attackers) and assess the performance of AoA-based authentication using one-class classifiers. Our results show that some attack techniques with knowledge of the combiners at the verifier are effective in falsifying the AoA and compromising the security of the considered type of physical layer authentication.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_08282
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle AoA-Based Physical Layer Authentication in Analog Arrays under Impersonation Attacks
Srinivasan, Muralikrishnan
Senigagliesi, Linda
Chen, Hui
Chorti, Arsenia
Baldi, Marco
Wymeersch, Henk
Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
We discuss the use of angle of arrival (AoA) as an authentication measure in analog array multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems. A base station equipped with an analog array authenticates users based on the AoA estimated from certified pilot transmissions, while active attackers manipulate their transmitted signals to mount impersonation attacks. We study several attacks of increasing intensity (captured through the availability of side information at the attackers) and assess the performance of AoA-based authentication using one-class classifiers. Our results show that some attack techniques with knowledge of the combiners at the verifier are effective in falsifying the AoA and compromising the security of the considered type of physical layer authentication.
title AoA-Based Physical Layer Authentication in Analog Arrays under Impersonation Attacks
topic Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.08282