Mon CHÉRI: Mitigating Uninitialized Memory Access with Conditional Capabilities
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866909841816027136 |
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| author | Gülmez, Merve Englund, Håkan Mühlberg, Jan Tobias Nyman, Thomas |
| author_facet | Gülmez, Merve Englund, Håkan Mühlberg, Jan Tobias Nyman, Thomas |
| contents | Up to 10% of memory-safety vulnerabilities in languages like C and C++ stem from uninitialized variables. This work addresses the prevalence and lack of adequate software mitigations for uninitialized memory issues, proposing architectural protections in hardware. Capability-based addressing, such as the University of Cambridge's CHERI, mitigates many memory defects, including spatial and temporal safety violations at an architectural level. CHERI, however, does not handle undefined behavior from uninitialized variables. We extend the CHERI capability model to include "conditional capabilities", enabling memory-access policies based on prior operations. This allows enforcement of policies that satisfy memory-safety objectives such as "no reads to memory without at least one prior write" (Write-before-Read). We present our architecture extension, compiler support, and detailed evaluation of our approach on the QEMU full-system simulator and a modified FPGA-based CHERI-RISCV softcore. Our evaluation shows conditional capabilities are practical, with high detection accuracy while adding a small (~3.5%) overhead which is comparable to the cost of baseline CHERI capabilities. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_08663 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Mon CHÉRI: Mitigating Uninitialized Memory Access with Conditional Capabilities Gülmez, Merve Englund, Håkan Mühlberg, Jan Tobias Nyman, Thomas Cryptography and Security Up to 10% of memory-safety vulnerabilities in languages like C and C++ stem from uninitialized variables. This work addresses the prevalence and lack of adequate software mitigations for uninitialized memory issues, proposing architectural protections in hardware. Capability-based addressing, such as the University of Cambridge's CHERI, mitigates many memory defects, including spatial and temporal safety violations at an architectural level. CHERI, however, does not handle undefined behavior from uninitialized variables. We extend the CHERI capability model to include "conditional capabilities", enabling memory-access policies based on prior operations. This allows enforcement of policies that satisfy memory-safety objectives such as "no reads to memory without at least one prior write" (Write-before-Read). We present our architecture extension, compiler support, and detailed evaluation of our approach on the QEMU full-system simulator and a modified FPGA-based CHERI-RISCV softcore. Our evaluation shows conditional capabilities are practical, with high detection accuracy while adding a small (~3.5%) overhead which is comparable to the cost of baseline CHERI capabilities. |
| title | Mon CHÉRI: Mitigating Uninitialized Memory Access with Conditional Capabilities |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.08663 |