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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.09310 |
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| _version_ | 1866913443496329216 |
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| author | Polacchi, Beatrice Leichtle, Dominik Carvacho, Gonzalo Milani, Giorgio Spagnolo, Nicolò Kaplan, Marc Kashefi, Elham Sciarrino, Fabio |
| author_facet | Polacchi, Beatrice Leichtle, Dominik Carvacho, Gonzalo Milani, Giorgio Spagnolo, Nicolò Kaplan, Marc Kashefi, Elham Sciarrino, Fabio |
| contents | The exploitation of certification tools by end users represents a fundamental aspect of the development of quantum technologies as the hardware scales up beyond the regime of classical simulatability. Certifying quantum networks becomes even more crucial when the privacy of their users is exposed to malicious quantum nodes or servers as in the case of multi-client distributed blind quantum computing, where several clients delegate a joint private computation to remote quantum servers, such as federated quantum machine learning. In such protocols, security must be provided not only by keeping data hidden but also by verifying that the server is correctly performing the requested computation while minimizing the hardware assumptions on the employed devices. Notably, standard verification techniques fail in scenarios where the clients receive quantum states from untrusted sources such as, for example, in a recently demonstrated linear quantum network performing multi-client blind quantum computation. However, recent theoretical results provide techniques to verify blind quantum computations even in the case of untrusted state preparation. Equipped with such theoretical tools, in this work, we provide the first experimental implementation of a two-client verifiable blind quantum computing protocol in a distributed architecture. The obtained results represent novel perspectives for the verification of multi-tenant distributed quantum computation in large-scale networks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_09310 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Experimental verifiable multi-client blind quantum computing on a Qline architecture Polacchi, Beatrice Leichtle, Dominik Carvacho, Gonzalo Milani, Giorgio Spagnolo, Nicolò Kaplan, Marc Kashefi, Elham Sciarrino, Fabio Quantum Physics The exploitation of certification tools by end users represents a fundamental aspect of the development of quantum technologies as the hardware scales up beyond the regime of classical simulatability. Certifying quantum networks becomes even more crucial when the privacy of their users is exposed to malicious quantum nodes or servers as in the case of multi-client distributed blind quantum computing, where several clients delegate a joint private computation to remote quantum servers, such as federated quantum machine learning. In such protocols, security must be provided not only by keeping data hidden but also by verifying that the server is correctly performing the requested computation while minimizing the hardware assumptions on the employed devices. Notably, standard verification techniques fail in scenarios where the clients receive quantum states from untrusted sources such as, for example, in a recently demonstrated linear quantum network performing multi-client blind quantum computation. However, recent theoretical results provide techniques to verify blind quantum computations even in the case of untrusted state preparation. Equipped with such theoretical tools, in this work, we provide the first experimental implementation of a two-client verifiable blind quantum computing protocol in a distributed architecture. The obtained results represent novel perspectives for the verification of multi-tenant distributed quantum computation in large-scale networks. |
| title | Experimental verifiable multi-client blind quantum computing on a Qline architecture |
| topic | Quantum Physics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.09310 |