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Main Authors: Cheng, Jiangjiang, Chen, Ge, Wu, Zhouming, Mu, Yifen
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.09948
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author Cheng, Jiangjiang
Chen, Ge
Wu, Zhouming
Mu, Yifen
author_facet Cheng, Jiangjiang
Chen, Ge
Wu, Zhouming
Mu, Yifen
contents The dynamic pricing of electricity is one of the most crucial demand response (DR) strategies in smart grid, where the utility company typically adjust electricity prices to influence user electricity demand. This paper models the relationship between the utility company and flexible electricity users as a Stackelberg game. Based on this model, we present a series of analytical results under certain conditions. First, we give an analytical Stackelberg equilibrium, namely the optimal pricing formula for utility company, as well as the unique and strict Nash equilibrium for users' electricity demand under this pricing scheme. To our best knowledge, it is the first optimal pricing formula in the research of price-based DR strategies. Also, if there exist prediction errors for the supply and demand of electricity, we provide an analytical expression for the energy supply cost of utility company. Moreover, a sufficient condition has been proposed that all electricity demands can be supplied by renewable energy. When the conditions for analytical results are not met, we provide a numerical solution algorithm for the Stackelberg equilibrium and verify its efficiency by simulation.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_09948
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle An Optimal Pricing Formula for Smart Grid based on Stackelberg Game
Cheng, Jiangjiang
Chen, Ge
Wu, Zhouming
Mu, Yifen
Optimization and Control
The dynamic pricing of electricity is one of the most crucial demand response (DR) strategies in smart grid, where the utility company typically adjust electricity prices to influence user electricity demand. This paper models the relationship between the utility company and flexible electricity users as a Stackelberg game. Based on this model, we present a series of analytical results under certain conditions. First, we give an analytical Stackelberg equilibrium, namely the optimal pricing formula for utility company, as well as the unique and strict Nash equilibrium for users' electricity demand under this pricing scheme. To our best knowledge, it is the first optimal pricing formula in the research of price-based DR strategies. Also, if there exist prediction errors for the supply and demand of electricity, we provide an analytical expression for the energy supply cost of utility company. Moreover, a sufficient condition has been proposed that all electricity demands can be supplied by renewable energy. When the conditions for analytical results are not met, we provide a numerical solution algorithm for the Stackelberg equilibrium and verify its efficiency by simulation.
title An Optimal Pricing Formula for Smart Grid based on Stackelberg Game
topic Optimization and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.09948