Defending Against Repetitive Backdoor Attacks on Semi-supervised Learning through Lens of Rate-Distortion-Perception Trade-off

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Lee, Cheng-Yi, Kao, Ching-Chia, Yeh, Cheng-Han, Lu, Chun-Shien, Yu, Chia-Mu, Chen, Chu-Song
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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author Lee, Cheng-Yi
Kao, Ching-Chia
Yeh, Cheng-Han
Lu, Chun-Shien
Yu, Chia-Mu
Chen, Chu-Song
author_facet Lee, Cheng-Yi
Kao, Ching-Chia
Yeh, Cheng-Han
Lu, Chun-Shien
Yu, Chia-Mu
Chen, Chu-Song
contents Semi-supervised learning (SSL) has achieved remarkable performance with a small fraction of labeled data by leveraging vast amounts of unlabeled data from the Internet. However, this large pool of untrusted data is extremely vulnerable to data poisoning, leading to potential backdoor attacks. Current backdoor defenses are not yet effective against such a vulnerability in SSL. In this study, we propose a novel method, Unlabeled Data Purification (UPure), to disrupt the association between trigger patterns and target classes by introducing perturbations in the frequency domain. By leveraging the Rate-Distortion-Perception (RDP) trade-off, we further identify the frequency band, where the perturbations are added, and justify this selection. Notably, UPure purifies poisoned unlabeled data without the need of extra clean labeled data. Extensive experiments on four benchmark datasets and five SSL algorithms demonstrate that UPure effectively reduces the attack success rate from 99.78% to 0% while maintaining model accuracy. Code is available here: \url{https://github.com/chengyi-chris/UPure}.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_10180
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Defending Against Repetitive Backdoor Attacks on Semi-supervised Learning through Lens of Rate-Distortion-Perception Trade-off
Lee, Cheng-Yi
Kao, Ching-Chia
Yeh, Cheng-Han
Lu, Chun-Shien
Yu, Chia-Mu
Chen, Chu-Song
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Semi-supervised learning (SSL) has achieved remarkable performance with a small fraction of labeled data by leveraging vast amounts of unlabeled data from the Internet. However, this large pool of untrusted data is extremely vulnerable to data poisoning, leading to potential backdoor attacks. Current backdoor defenses are not yet effective against such a vulnerability in SSL. In this study, we propose a novel method, Unlabeled Data Purification (UPure), to disrupt the association between trigger patterns and target classes by introducing perturbations in the frequency domain. By leveraging the Rate-Distortion-Perception (RDP) trade-off, we further identify the frequency band, where the perturbations are added, and justify this selection. Notably, UPure purifies poisoned unlabeled data without the need of extra clean labeled data. Extensive experiments on four benchmark datasets and five SSL algorithms demonstrate that UPure effectively reduces the attack success rate from 99.78% to 0% while maintaining model accuracy. Code is available here: \url{https://github.com/chengyi-chris/UPure}.
title Defending Against Repetitive Backdoor Attacks on Semi-supervised Learning through Lens of Rate-Distortion-Perception Trade-off
topic Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.10180