UNIT: Backdoor Mitigation via Automated Neural Distribution Tightening

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Cheng, Siyuan, Shen, Guangyu, Zhang, Kaiyuan, Tao, Guanhong, An, Shengwei, Guo, Hanxi, Ma, Shiqing, Zhang, Xiangyu
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2024
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author Cheng, Siyuan
Shen, Guangyu
Zhang, Kaiyuan
Tao, Guanhong
An, Shengwei
Guo, Hanxi
Ma, Shiqing
Zhang, Xiangyu
author_facet Cheng, Siyuan
Shen, Guangyu
Zhang, Kaiyuan
Tao, Guanhong
An, Shengwei
Guo, Hanxi
Ma, Shiqing
Zhang, Xiangyu
contents Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated effectiveness in various fields. However, DNNs are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which inject a unique pattern, called trigger, into the input to cause misclassification to an attack-chosen target label. While existing works have proposed various methods to mitigate backdoor effects in poisoned models, they tend to be less effective against recent advanced attacks. In this paper, we introduce a novel post-training defense technique UNIT that can effectively eliminate backdoor effects for a variety of attacks. In specific, UNIT approximates a unique and tight activation distribution for each neuron in the model. It then proactively dispels substantially large activation values that exceed the approximated boundaries. Our experimental results demonstrate that UNIT outperforms 7 popular defense methods against 14 existing backdoor attacks, including 2 advanced attacks, using only 5\% of clean training data. UNIT is also cost efficient. The code is accessible at https://github.com/Megum1/UNIT.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_11372
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle UNIT: Backdoor Mitigation via Automated Neural Distribution Tightening
Cheng, Siyuan
Shen, Guangyu
Zhang, Kaiyuan
Tao, Guanhong
An, Shengwei
Guo, Hanxi
Ma, Shiqing
Zhang, Xiangyu
Cryptography and Security
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated effectiveness in various fields. However, DNNs are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which inject a unique pattern, called trigger, into the input to cause misclassification to an attack-chosen target label. While existing works have proposed various methods to mitigate backdoor effects in poisoned models, they tend to be less effective against recent advanced attacks. In this paper, we introduce a novel post-training defense technique UNIT that can effectively eliminate backdoor effects for a variety of attacks. In specific, UNIT approximates a unique and tight activation distribution for each neuron in the model. It then proactively dispels substantially large activation values that exceed the approximated boundaries. Our experimental results demonstrate that UNIT outperforms 7 popular defense methods against 14 existing backdoor attacks, including 2 advanced attacks, using only 5\% of clean training data. UNIT is also cost efficient. The code is accessible at https://github.com/Megum1/UNIT.
title UNIT: Backdoor Mitigation via Automated Neural Distribution Tightening
topic Cryptography and Security
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.11372