The Pay and Non-Pay Content of Job Ads
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866913162838671360 |
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| author | Audoly, Richard Bhuller, Manudeep Reiremo, Tore Adam |
| author_facet | Audoly, Richard Bhuller, Manudeep Reiremo, Tore Adam |
| contents | How informative are job ads about the actual pay and non-pay attributes offered by employers? Using a comprehensive database of job ads posted by Norwegian employers, we develop a methodology to systematically classify the pay and non-pay job attributes advertised in vacancy texts. About 60% of job ads provide pay-related information and nearly all ads feature information on non-pay attributes. We link these advertised attributes to the employers posting the ads and validate this information against revealed-preference measures of employer quality, realized attributes, and choices from a survey experiment. All three strategies confirm that job ads provide reliable signals of employer quality. We then incorporate the detailed job attributes in a monopsony framework and quantify their contribution to labor market inequality. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_13204 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Pay and Non-Pay Content of Job Ads Audoly, Richard Bhuller, Manudeep Reiremo, Tore Adam General Economics Economics How informative are job ads about the actual pay and non-pay attributes offered by employers? Using a comprehensive database of job ads posted by Norwegian employers, we develop a methodology to systematically classify the pay and non-pay job attributes advertised in vacancy texts. About 60% of job ads provide pay-related information and nearly all ads feature information on non-pay attributes. We link these advertised attributes to the employers posting the ads and validate this information against revealed-preference measures of employer quality, realized attributes, and choices from a survey experiment. All three strategies confirm that job ads provide reliable signals of employer quality. We then incorporate the detailed job attributes in a monopsony framework and quantify their contribution to labor market inequality. |
| title | The Pay and Non-Pay Content of Job Ads |
| topic | General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.13204 |