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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.13661 |
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| _version_ | 1866909262053113856 |
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| author | Deshpande, Sanyukta Garg, Nikhil Jacobson, Sheldon |
| author_facet | Deshpande, Sanyukta Garg, Nikhil Jacobson, Sheldon |
| contents | Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) and Single Transferable Voting (STV) are widely valued; but are complex to understand due to intricate per-round vote transfers. Questions like determining how far a candidate is from winning or identifying effective election strategies are computationally challenging as minor changes in voter rankings can lead to significant ripple effects - for example, lending support to a losing candidate can prevent their votes from transferring to a more competitive opponent. We study optimal strategies - persuading voters to change their ballots or adding new voters - both algorithmically and theoretically. Algorithmically, we develop efficient methods to reduce election instances while maintaining optimization accuracy, effectively circumventing the computational complexity barrier. Theoretically, we analyze the effectiveness of strategies under both perfect and imperfect polling information. Our algorithmic approach applies to the ranked-choice polling data on the US 2024 Republican Primary, finding, for example, that several candidates would have been optimally served by boosting another candidate instead of themselves. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2407_13661 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Optimal Strategies in Ranked Choice Voting Deshpande, Sanyukta Garg, Nikhil Jacobson, Sheldon Computer Science and Game Theory Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) and Single Transferable Voting (STV) are widely valued; but are complex to understand due to intricate per-round vote transfers. Questions like determining how far a candidate is from winning or identifying effective election strategies are computationally challenging as minor changes in voter rankings can lead to significant ripple effects - for example, lending support to a losing candidate can prevent their votes from transferring to a more competitive opponent. We study optimal strategies - persuading voters to change their ballots or adding new voters - both algorithmically and theoretically. Algorithmically, we develop efficient methods to reduce election instances while maintaining optimization accuracy, effectively circumventing the computational complexity barrier. Theoretically, we analyze the effectiveness of strategies under both perfect and imperfect polling information. Our algorithmic approach applies to the ranked-choice polling data on the US 2024 Republican Primary, finding, for example, that several candidates would have been optimally served by boosting another candidate instead of themselves. |
| title | Optimal Strategies in Ranked Choice Voting |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.13661 |